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ABSTRACT 
The "object" of thispaper isparadonical. Zt aaempts to show (communicate) how Salman Rushdie's The Moor's 
Last Sigh muy be readfrom a "Lacanian" point of view: how a number of "Lacanian " concepts can be usejül 
to thematize various levels of (mis)communication and (given the arsumptioni of the temal  strategy employed), 
the im'tability of wider-ranging f o m  of (mis)understanding. Zt also suggests thnt the so-called intelpretation 
of the objed tea is jurt as much un allegory of the method usd:  the subject-object binary tending to break down. 
This results in M ambivalent relaiion: is "Lacanian" criticism intelpreting The Moor, or, is The Moor a 
parabolic form of Lacanian theory? This intelpretive/theoretical dialectic is jünher problematized by the 
theoretical syszem's challenge to both the ontological certainty of the object of inrelpretation and the ontological 
stability and epistemological value of the intelpretive scheme itself. 
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"What do we mean by communication? The oldest meaning of the word, in English, 
can be sumrnarized as the passing of ideas, information, and attitudes from person to person. 
But, later, communication carne aiso to mean a line or channel from place to place". So begins 
Raymond Williams' study entitled, C 0 ~ ' c ~ ' o n . s  (Wiiarns, 1976:9).' Although this highly 
generaiized definition may still seem relevant to the 1990's the theoretical basis upon which 
this paper rests wiil render the model of communication as the transmission and reception of 
ideas highly problematic. This, to put the matter into the context of linguistics, is the result 
of what rnight be called the post-Saussurean revolution of the sign. Here the language-referent 
model was challenged by the semiotic paradigm3 which put the stress on language as a self- 
enclosed relational system; a change of emphasis which would send reverberations well 
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beyond the specialized domain of linguistics - notably (and significantly for this essay) in the 
discourses of the human sciences, especially those of textual theory and psychoanalysis. The 
latter discourses, in their so-cailed post-structuralist forms, would not only come to challenge 
the transmission model but also contest the idea of defmable unproblematical spaces. Thus, 
the theoretician who provides the interpretive dynarnic "behind", or "in", this essay was able 
to rewrite Descartes cogito ergo sum as: "1 think where 1 am not, therefore 1 am where 1 do 
not think" (Lacan, 1977: 166). 
2. REALITY, COMMUNICATION AND SLBJECTIVE SPACES: ERECTION AND 
CASTRATION 
This questioning of subjective positioning has ontologicai, epistemological and 
hermeneutic consequences. Ontologically definitions can no longer be caught within the fixed 
frarne associated with positivistic forms of thinking (positivistic because positivism cannot be 
reduced to an unproblematic homogeneous discourse). The lack of a fixed centre4 from which 
to establish categorial definitions attacks the basis, not only of the dominant social sciences 
model of knowledge and communication, but also that of the idealist following in the Cartesian 
tradition: "1 think, therefore 1 am" cannot be the starting-point, or a final (safe) refuge in the 
self, because the "self", according to the Lac(k)anian system (or the way in which it can be 
systematized5) is a sign: i.e. the product of language. Language, part of what Lacan calls the 
"symbolic order", offers the positions of perceiving subject or perceived object which are 
constantly subject to alternation or change. (1 write Lac(k)anian to indicate that my version of 
Lacan is, for theoreticai and practica1 reasons, deficient - full of "lack".) If 1 feel empowered 
on the one hand by my position as subject, 1 can, on the other, just as easily be displaced or 
disempowered (symbolically castrated) by becoming the object of someone else's discourse. 
Although the (anti-)hero of the novel to be discussed is bom with a terrific erection he will be 
subjected to thoroughgoing castration from this point of view. The subject, then, may feel 
empowered on the one hand or, on the other, "de-centred" - that is, ousted from a privileged 
place and consigned to the margins or to a place of insignificance or relative weakness. 
Epistemologically, this renders knowledge about the self or the world highly 
indetenninate. Freud's ideas had split the subject by emphasizing the irrational, potentially 
destructive forces of the unconscious which required those working in the tradition of 
psychoanalysis to adopt a model of cornmunication which took into account hidden latent 
possibilities; Lac(k)anian thought has further complicated the theoreticai landscape (to adopt 
a topographicai metaphor) by requiring the critic to consider the self in terms of a semiotic 
system. As 1 shall try to show, this semiotic approach throws systems of human 
cornmunication into utter disarray. In epistemologicai tenns Lac(k)anian theory tends to 
question the reliabiity of claims to knowledge: communications do not serve to communicate 
easily decipherable messages, but to scramble them. Lac(k)anian critics, of course, seem to 
be in a privileged position - but even this, according to the consequences of the controlling 
concepts, is an illusion. 
Hermeneutically, interpretive acts must always take into account that there is no way 
out of the symbolic system (and its uncertainties) which make the act of interpretation possible. 
Hence during the course of the paper 1 introduce a number of orthographic puns to remind the 
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reader of the gaps between the desire for understanding or closure (e.g. JDentity) and how the 
self is caught in the Other, or the alterity of language (e.g. allEGOry).6 There is no form of 
meta-commentary that can put the interpreter above the duplicitous nature of the sign, and 
hence the orthographical glues.. . 1 mean, clues. If Descartes ultimately fe11 back on the cogito 
argument, then the Lac(k)anian, like the deconstmctionist, can only fa11 back on one certainty: 
that the nature of the sign is indeterminate - which (in terms of arriving at certainties) is not 
to concede the interpreting self (or the system of interpretation) very much. These uncertainties 
engendered by the Lac(k)anian system wiil be explored through a reading of Salman Rushdie's 
?le Moor's Lust Sigh. It rnight also be noted here that the novel is so full of possibilities for 
Lac(k)anian forms of analysis that this paper is a mere scratch on the surface. 
3. DEATH SENTENCES 
3.1. Salman Rushdie's me Moor's Last Sigh and the Lac(k)anian "spool" of crITicism. 
An allEGOry. 
The main protagonist of Rushdie's novel, The Moor's Lust Sigh, afflicted with a 
premature ageing disorder and a deformed right hand, is Moraes Zogoiby (called the "Moor") 
whose life is dominated by two women: his mother (Aurora) and a lover (Uma), significantly 
described by him as "the two great super-powers". These two "powers", he tells us, were 
thought to look alike, but, he continues, "1 never saw it, couldn't see it at all" (Rushdie, 
19%:3). These particulars seem tdor  made for the classical Freudian critic whose interpretive 
s&ategies could hardly forbear linking these details to the Oedipai scenario (it is worth noting 
that his mother's name refers to the sunrise - so essential to life - and that his girl-fnend's 
narne includes a con&action of mother "m" ) .  The fact that Rushdie has the mother murdered 
in mysterious circumstances and the girlfriend die in a fake suicide attempt both tend to invite 
the simplicities of a "vulgar" Freudian reading - as does the detail that the Moor is bom with 
an erection which irnpedes his passage into the world (and thus there is a literal erotic 
attachrnent to the mother). The deformed hand, though, can be read as a displaced symbol of 
castration at birth. These details indicate how suggestive this text is to a Freudian approach, 
but this paper wiil only concen&ate on a number of features which may reflect on the thematics 
set out in the introductory paragraphs. These features, however, can be read with relation to 
the symbolic empowerments and disempowerments which will be important to the reading of 
The Moor's Last Sigh offered here. 
However, back to the Lac(k)anian system and Moor's mother. The mother is described 
as an eminent twentiethcentmy painter who dominated cultural life in Bombay, and who was 
known for her portraits of her only son, the Moor. So it could be said that the Moor is 
represented through the mother's gaze which is fundamental to the way his IDentity emerges 
throughout the novel.7 One of the ways this could be read is to see this from the point of view 
of the entry into what Lacan called the symbolic order, where the subject is forced to see itself 
through the signifying system: i.e. see itself from the position of the Other (Le. through the 
linguistic, cultural (symbolic) systems which precede the subject's e n 0  into them). Of course, 
this works both ways (we are al1 constructed in the discourse of the Other): if the Moor is 
represented, so can he be said to represent the representar because, as he says: "What then can 
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the humble clay usefully say about the hands that moulded it? Perhaps simply this: that I was 
there. And that during the years of sittings 1 rnade a kind of portrait of her, too. She was 
looking at me, and 1 was looking right back" ( f i e  Moor's Last Sigh (Rushdie, 1996:219)). 
The two gazes are locked into the positiom set up by the symbolic order: at one level, subject 
and object (which is reversible here); at anOther level the positionings of mOther and son, 
with the prohibitions which this relation entails. (Later 1'11 suggest that a displaced form of 
incest brings about the rupture between mother and son.) 
So from the very beginning it is possible to thematize the events according to the 
Lac(k)anian symbolic register. Take the following paragraph which describes the mother: 
"To be the offspring of our daemonic Aurora," 1 was told when young by the 
Goan painter V. (for Vasco) Miranda, "is to be, truly, a modem Lucifer. You 
know: son of the bloorning moming." By then my farnily had moved to 
Bombay, and this was the kind of thing that passed, in the Paradise of Aurora 
Zogoiby's legendary salon, for a compiiment; but 1 remember it as a prophesy, 
because the day carne when 1 was indeed hurled from that fabulous garden, and 
plunged towards Pandaemonium. (Banished from the natural, what choice did 
1 have but to embrace its opposite? Which is to say, unnahiralism, the only real 
ism of these back-to-front and jabberwocky days. Placed beyond the Pale, 
would you not seek to make light of the Dark? Just so. Moraes Zogoiby, 
expelled from his story, tumbled towards history.) (Rushdie, 1996:5) 
It is significant that the Moor's life with his mother and his later rejection is described 
in Christian terms. First he inhabits a paradise, "a fabulous garden". This can be related to the 
Lac(k)anian pre-symbolic stage of undifferentiated being and plenitude. Continuing the 
Christian story the division from the mother is described as a fa11 into hell, which is a 
banishment from the "natural" - this could be read as referring to the division from the pre- 
linguistic world dorninated by primal needs, or the Lac(k)anian pre-symbolic. With the 
division from the motherlparadise the Moor asks, "what choice did 1 have but to embrace its 
opposite?" Tbat is, "unnaturalism". The embracing of the opposite can be seen as an aliEGOry 
of the subject's entry into the symbolic order of differences - a kind of "unnatural" state which 
divides the subject from itself, its pre-symbolic "natural" condition.' It may be noticed also 
that the Moor is now beyond "the Pale", i.e. placed beyond a limit or boundary. Thus the 
protagonist, in being thrust from the mother, has crossed a limit from which there can be no 
retum. Of course, he is a grown man when this occurs, and this is why 1 say it is like an 
allEGOry of the entry into the symbolic register. 
This thernatization or aliEGOrization can be brought out further with reference to the 
phrase which follows the word "unnahiralism" - "the only real ism of these back-to-front and 
jabberwocky days". Here it might be noted that what is on the other side of the lirnit (Le. 
beyond total union with the self and mother) is the "ism": the suffix which points to "back-to- 
front and jabberwocky days". The jabberwocky was, of course, a poem in Lewis Carroll's 
nrough the Looking Glass characterized by nomense syllables and meaningless speech - a 
kind of poetic gibbensh. This can be related to what in Lac(k)anian theory is called the 
"unary" signifier. This can be descnbed as a sound which a young pre-symbolic child can 
produce but is meaningless (it's a signifier with no ~ignified)~. However, once the child begins 
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to distinguish between things, sounds are no longer forms of meaningless gibber but parts of 
a symbolic code. Once a child can distinguish between only two things verbally, this is a 
pivotal event: the child has a b i m y  pair of signifiers and the entry into the symbolic order of 
language has begun. 
So when subjects enter the symbolic they are plunged into a set of pre-determined 
relations, but are also confined to speech or language which seems "back-to-front". This can 
be seen as the failure of the symbolic to be able to articulate (adequately) need and satisfy 
desire. The Moor descends from "pure", undifferentiated (biological-libidinal) being (the 
"Real")" into a kind of hell (Pandemonium) where he is, as he says, "expelled from his story" 
(the pre-symbolic world of undifferentiated being and satisfaction), and "tumbled towards 
history": i.e. a smctured discourse in which he is caught and subject to the cultural/linguistic 
positions implied by the symbolic order and the losses and lacks that the entry into this order 
entails. From this point of view it is interesting to note that the novel is presented as a 
manuscript which the Moor has nailed to "a gate, a fence, an olive-tree, spreading it across 
this landscape of [his] last journey" (Rushdie, 1996:3); something tending to emphasize the 
purely textura1 nature of the subject's (his)story. 
The Moor, then, can be said to come into existence as a purely textual phenomenon 
(another Lac(k)anian allEGOry of the entry into the symbolic) because the story cannot be 
read until the manuscript has been finished (nailed up) and the Moor has died. (The novel 
could be said to begin with not so much the Moor's last sigh, but his last written sign.) As 
iacan said in one of his seminars (speaking of Oedipus' death): "I  am made man in the hour 
when I cease to be" @can, 1988:155). This could be read in at least two ways. One, the entry 
into the symbolic effectively cuts the subject off from the pre-symbolic Real, and so (in 
Lac(k)anian terms) a kind of "death" is enacted: to become "me" 1 alienate myself from myself 
- leave my pre-symbolic undifferentiated self (or as iac(k)an might say, 1 can only find myself 
in the field of the Other)."' (In this context it may be of interest to note that there may be, in 
the ghostly echo of the Moor's name, Moraes, "more ash" - given its pronunciation according 
to the Portuguese phonetic system; the Moor being of Portuguese extraction.) This leads to 
point two, that my sense of identity or "self' is not entirely dependent on me. "1 am made", 
not only because "I", as a personal pronoun is a product of the symbolic (which structures 
"me" - which includes the unconsci~us~~) ,  but that "1" am not the object of my making (my 
manipuiations of the symbolic), in so far that my identity is also dependent on how 1 am seen 
as an object by others. As 1 shall suggest below, life and death only have meaning with 
relation to the symbolic. The death of the body is a return to the Real which could not be the 
subject of (his)story were it not captured within the symbolic register. Textual/symbolic death 
is only posible wiih the utter annihilation of al1 references to a subject - as sign, as memory - 
a total aphanisis or fading (Lacan, 1979:207) within the system of representation. 
3.2. Reading Real to reel. 
At the point where ihe Moor is made and, paradoxically, ceases to be, he, predictably, 
in the iac(k)anian scheme of things, suffers the fate of all who enter the symbolic: he is caught 
out by the Lac(k)anian axiom that languuge is not the propeqy of those who use ir. l2 This is, 
perhaps, best exemplified by the great love of the Moor's life, Uma, who can be used to 
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allEGOrize the Lac(k)anian post-Saussurean view of the sign as a signifier which can never 
be stabilized into fixed unequivocal meaning: 
What was truly rernarkable was that during that morning amble at Mahalaxme 
the newcomer [Uma] found a way to spend a few private minutes with each of 
us in tum, and after she departed ... every one of us had a fiercely held opinion 
about her, and many of these opinions contradicted each other utterly and were 
incapable of being reconciled. (Rushdie, 1996:243)13 
Urna tums out to be protean: not just a signifier with multiple signifieds, but multivalent. She 
is also a gifted artist who is intensely disliked by the Moor's mother; an abhorrence which is 
retumed - but with a vengeance. That vengeance begins in the following way. One day, during 
the act of love, Uma mentions the mother's hostility and the following scene takes place: 
1 confess that at that high instant 1 had no stomach for this talk. An obscenity 
sprang unbidden to my lips. Fuck her then. - " What was that you said?" 1 said 
fuck her. Fuck my mother. 0. (Rushdie, 1996:252) 
The Moor explains that Urna: 
returned time and again to the topic of my mother's hostility, until it seemed 
to become a part of what excited her. - She hates me hates me te11 me what to 
do. - And 1 was expected to reply, and, forgive me, in the grip of lust 1 
answered as required. Screw her 1 said. Screw her stupid the stupid bitch. And 
Uma: How: Darling, darling, how? Fuck her upside down and sideways too. 
0 ,  you can, my only sweet, if you want to, if you only say you want. - God 
yes. 1 want to. Yes. O God. (Ibid.) 
What Uma does is to record these "obscenities" onto a cassette and, without the Moor's 
knowledge, play them to bis parents. This results in his banishrnent from the family home and 
disinheritance. Although a "vulgar" Freudian reading might see the whole incIDent as a 
displacement of the author's latent oedipal fantasies, it can also be seen as an allegory of how 
language or the sign is never entirely within the subject's control. On the surface the Moor 
utters the obscenities to please Uma, but Uma can be said to return them to their forbIDden 
latent source, converting them, out of the context in which they were uttered, into expressions 
of the incest taboo. A Lac&)anian reading could bring out both meanings: Uma's exploitation 
of the words is not necessarily a distortion of some "original" meaning because there is no way 
to establish what that meaning might be; but on the other hand, this structure is like a parable 
of how the sign both represses and (indirectly) reveals oedipal desire. 
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Signification could be allEGOrized in the following way: 
Much later in the novel, when it is too late for a reconciliation with his mother (for she 
is dead), the Moor is sent the tape of obscenities by his father (a structure of linguistic relations 
reminiscent of those Lacan analyzed in his "Seminar on 'The Purloined Letter"' (Lacan, 
1976)).15 On listening to the tape he believes he has solved the riddle of Uma's treachery. This 
is what we might caii the "Phallic function": he believes he now understands eve ry ihg  - has 
a rnistaken feeling of power and authority in his attempt to arrest the play of signification by 
giving it coherent meaning. However, from the Freudian/Lac@)anian viewpoint the rIDdle 
still remains unsolved because although the Moor sees decqtion he fails to see the possibilities 
of a latent displaced meaning behind his words. The obscenities, from the Lac(k)anian 
standpoint, are not only an attempt to satisfy Uma's desires (which he can't fully understand 
or gratify) but, ironicaiiy, an uncomious attempt to satisfy his own repressed oedipal wishes, 
s o m e t h .  also, according to the Lac(k)anian system, doomed to failure. What the Moor does 
not know (this is the job of the analyst) is that his unconscious desires are manifesting 
themselves through his speech - in this case in the most obvious and paradoxical way (in fact, 
in an almost unthinkable form in Freudian terms): what the obscenities mean at the suvace 
leve1 is what they mean at the laten? level. But because the Moor thinks, or believes, that his 
The Moor 
The moor utters the 
obscenities thinking 
he's satisfying a 
desire (which 
becomes a demand) 
but is unable to 
fully understand it 
(Uma's needs are 
more complex than 
he thinks). He 
invests his signifiers 
with his own 
meaning but now 
they become Uma's 
ProPeq.  
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because the Moor's parents are 
also duped by Uma, the "defile" 
through which the signs have 
Urna 
Uma now possesses the 
signifiers (the obscenities). 
It could be (as the Moor 
thought) that she became 
sexually aroused while 
listening to them but she 
puts them to her own use. 
The Moor, from a 
Lac(k)anian point of view, 
could never satisfy Uma's 
desires. Uma could 
symbolize the problems of 
signification: she is the 
carrier or medium of the 
sign always doomed to fail 
- the bearer of 
(mis)comrnunication. 
The Moor's Parents 
The Moor's parents now take 
possession of the signifiers but do 
not understand the "defiles" 
through which the signs have 
passed (which I've symbolized as 
Urna). The obscenities, which the 
Moor uttered to satisfy Uma's 
desire, now encounter the Name 
(or the Law) of the Father - the 
patriarchal law which prohibits 
incestuous relations and confers 
meaning on the signifiers. Thus 
the patriarchal law exercises its 
authority and the Moor is 
castigated: i.e. disinherited and 
cut off from his mother.I4 It is 
worth noting here that, in 
conferring meaning on the 
signifiers, the patriarchal law is no 
nearer to "truth" or "reality " 
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words are satisfying Uma's desires, he never considers the possibility that they rnay be 
satisfying his own forbIDden unwnscious cravings. During the act of love he utters his 
repressed fantasies and wuid be said to satisfy them doubly: in the verbal expression of them, 
and in converting U(ma) into a displaced physical syrnbol of his rnother. 
As suggested above, although the Moor may have felt he was giving pleasure by 
satisfying Uma's desire, and although the desire he understood her to have may have been 
satisfied, he was unwittingly satisfying her hidden desire to destroy his relations with his 
family. He is, as a result of the mismatch between what he believes about Uma and what she 
turns out to be, decentred from the privileged place of provider of pleasure and subordinated 
as the victirn of malice. He is, in short, not so much a victim of the return of the "Real", but 
the retum of the "reel", made posible by this, a kind of Lac(k)anian "spool" of criticism. 
Here is a return of the "reel" (spool) which can be seen as the return of the Lac(k)anian 
"Real" because, as Zizek explains: "The role of the Lac(k)anian real is, however, radically 
ambiguous: m e ,  it erupts in the form of a traumatic retum, derailing the balance of our daily 
lives, but it serves at the same time as a support of this very balance" (Zizek, 1991:29). This 
can be explained by observing that the return of the cassette is like a traumatic retum (UIMa's 
symbolic retum(s) from the dead). But the Moor converts this trauma into the illusion of 
understanding: his impotence is converted into a form of potency where he now appears to 
wield interpretive authority over the sign and thus restore, if not a balance over his daily life, 
a certain illusory power over the interpretation of his personal history. 
At one point, when the Moor realizes that he has been the victim of Uma's deceptions, 
he writes: "To give up one's own picture of the world and become wholly dependent on 
someone else's - was not that as good a description as any of the process of, literally, going 
out of one's mind?" (Rushdie, 1996:267). Yet from the Lac(k)anian perspective subjects are 
always in someone else's picture of the world, in so far that signification not o d y  positions 
us according to its pre-detennined rules and prohibitions, but that we are never in control of 
the symbolic system that enables us to represent, but more importantly, to be represented. 
The Moor, then, in not knowing how he was viewed as an object of Uma's or his 
parents' gaze (as dupe on the one hand and obscene rnother hater-lover on the other) is caught 
between his sense of self and how he is seen from the outside. It could be said, using a post- 
structuraiist cliche, that he is radically "split": his identity is the object of representation; and 
he is divided in terms of what he thinks (the rational) and what is beneath his thinking 
(repressed unconscious desires). He is like the child at the Lac(k)anian "mirror stage" who 
mistakes his self-image for a stable self which is beyond him because it is not entirely 
dependent on him; it being the product of how he is positioned and interpreted within the 
symbolic system of representation.'6 It could be said that he identifies with a misleadingly 
coherent image of himself. However, it is worth remembering that even if Urna were not a 
deceiver, the Moor, from the Lac(k)anian point of view, would never know hirnself or the 
Other, because the Real (like Kant's nournenon - that upon which language is working) could 
never be rnanifested as itself: it could o d y  be represented within the misleading defiles of 
signification. 
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4. SENTENCING DEATH: THE SIGN'S LAST SIGH. 
1 mote above that the novel can be seen as emphasizing that the whole narrative, and 
al1 those in it, are essentially caught within the symbolic order of textuality. Indeed, the 
Moor's "last sigh" coincides with his abandonrnent of the text he has written, and the novel 
en& with a kind of postscript announcing his death - which, as suggested above, is the Moor's 
last sign which brings the act of reading into play. (Actuaiiy, the novel is circular in so far that 
it begins where it ends in a graveyard just down the road from the "Ultimo Suspiro gas station" 
(Rushdie, 1996:4).) 
1 stressed earlier (quoting Lacan) that the subject comes to life at the moment when it 
ceases to be and in this way the Moor's death becomes, paradoxically, a kind of birth: it is the 
moment (or the coilection of dispersed moments) when the narrative comes into being (death, 
being announced both at the beginning and at the end, circumscribes al1 the events). The 
narrative, between these two chronicles of a death foretold, is strewn across the landscape 
which, metaphorically, aiiows the reader to step into it. The individual reader's entry into the 
(fictional) syrnbolic order equals the narrative beginning (or birth) of the Moor. This moment 
of fictional death paradoxically ailegorizes a Todorovian theme being also the moment of the 
possibility of his narrative life: that is, through the act of reading. The longer the Moor 
prolongs his fictional death (paradoxically through the narration of his entire life) the longer 
he can eke out his fictional existence." 
As emphasized above, for the LacO<)anian the self is an "effect" of language - subjects 
are a product of the symbolic register, positioned by it and articulated through it. The only 
way to escape subjectivity is to abandon the symbolic, to die out of language, and this, in 
effect, is what the Moor seems to do. With the tennination of his last page he effects what 
seems to be a textual (symbolic) death. But this is not so because it only, paradoxically, retums 
the reader to the point of departure (the phrase itself suggesting both beginning and 
(euphernistic) death). 
How then would a symbolic death be possible? Again it is possible to tum to Rushdie's 
novel for a parabolic model (ihe foilowing passage has a "logic" of its own within the fictional 
world of the novel, because Uma could be said to be "polyphrenic" - a self made up of 
mulitiple selves). However, appropriately, when Uma dies, the Moor writes of her death: 
Her face in death seemed to pass through a thousand changes, as if the pages 
of a book were tuming, as if she were giving up, one by one, al1 her 
numberless selves. And then a blank page, and she was no longer anyone at all. 
(Rushdie, 1996:281) 
To die both biologically and symbolically the subject must become like the blank page. It is 
only by turning the blank page, by escaping representation, that the subject and its multiple 
selves are finally aiiowed to rest. In effect, the subject as biological subject dies, but lives on, 
as long as it is caught within signification: the symbolic enables a symbolic life even in 
biological death. For as long as the subject can be narned it can be subject to the generation 
of numberless selves @ke Uma and al1 the other characters of the novel). Not until al1 textual 
referentes to it are finally destroyed and it disappears from the realms of the symbolic and 
returns to the Real can it finally suffer the sign's last sigh. But in this novel, because of its 
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circular consmction, the Moor's last sighJsign seems to signify his first (and his first his last) 
in so far that the end is the beginning and the beginning is the end. 
5. CONCLUSION: GOING ROUND IN (HERMENEUTICAL) CIRCLES. ON BEING 
OUT O F  ONE'S MIND. 
Not only can man's being not be understood without madness, it would not be 
rnan's being ifit did not hear madness within itselfas the limit of hisfreedom. 
(Lacan 1977: 215) 
Coming back to Raymond Williams, although the implicit theory of language 
underlying his project of analyzing modern systems of communication was very distinct, he 
does touch on two factors highly pertinent to the thematics of this essay. The first is a 
phenomenologicai issue. "Many people", Williams notes "seem to assurne as a matter of 
course that there is, first, reality, and then, second, communication about it. We degrade art 
and leaming by supposing that they are always second-hand activities: that there is life, and 
then afterwards there are these accounts of it" (Williams, 1976:ll). From the Lac(k)anian 
point of view adopted here Williams questioning of the "reality" and "communication" division 
is of great importante. Communication and reality are united in so far that they are attributes 
of the same thing: the symbolic order. 
This first point is linked to the question of what it is this kind of Lac(k)anian 
interpretation is doíng. Phenomenological research has helped to demonstrate that the objects 
of analysis or interpretation cannot be separated from the theoretical and methodological 
assumptions of the interpreting subject. This has resulted in a situation where to interpret the 
"other" has also brought with it a corresponding awareness of the role of the interpreting self. 
From this standpoint the subject/object opposition begins to break down resulting in forms of 
criticism where the interpretation of the object text is as much an ailEGOrization of the method 
used.'' This, in tum, has linlcs with the following point. 
The second factor Williams mentions that has relevance to the thematics of this paper 
is epistemological. Williams claims that communication begins "in the struggle to learn and 
to describe". The passing on of this "learning" and description depends on "certain 
communication models, certain rules and conventions through which we can make contact" 
(Williams, 1976: 11). The Lac(k)anian system (like that of deconstruction) can only serve as 
a communication model through a certain contradiction: theorists must suspend their 
Coleridgean disbelief in the duplicitous character of the sign and assign some value to what 
are perceived as the controlling concepts of interpretation. These concepts, however (as 
intelligible ideas which provide the conventions through which a "Lac(k)aniann reading is 
rendered possible) couid never (according to the theory of the sign inscnbed in these pages) 
offer the critic a set of conventions which were beyond the radical scepticism which would put 
them (and everythmg else) under permanent question - hence the multitude of qualifications 
in subclauses made necessary by self-defeating sentences which render the style here something 
of a linguistic assauit course. lg What the diaiectical tension between radical scepticism and the 
suspension of disbelief offers is a form of textual production (and distinctive kinds of 
description of human subjectivity) which challenges epistemological and hermeneutic practices 
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that search for or promise authoritative, unproblematic interpretations. The theoristlcritic who 
is convinced by the rhetorical force of the Lac(k)anian critique of the sign is forced to accept 
that it is not only the interpretation that is unstable (a comrnonplace in much late twentieth- 
century cultural criticism) but that the theoretical system itself is not a stable entity with an a 
pnori existence before the task of interpretation begins. 
To put this another way, Roman Jakobson has made the point that a "message sent by 
its addresser must be adequately perceived by its receiver. Any message is encoded by its 
sender and is to be decoded by its addressee" (Jakobson, 1971: 130). The problem here from 
the Lac(k)anian standpoint (as 1 have represented it) is that it is not only the message that is 
unstable, but also the code upon which the message is based. Also, the addresser and addressee 
are radically undennined because their perception of "themselves" is based upon their 
immersion in the symbolic order which constitutes the message and code upon which their 
notions of "themselves" as subjects or objects is based. 
So critics can never be sure about the interpretation of the theoretical scheme before 
textuai production begins. This, given the post-stmctural theory of the sign, would be true of 
any approach, but as 1 suggested in the introduction, the case of Lacan seems to provide an 
allegory of the epistemological, ontological and hermeneutical difficulties that beguile any 
attempt at interpretation. However, if al1 is lack, al1 is not necessarily lost. Lac(k)anian 
psychoanalysis can help to focus not only on the problems of the textual production of the 
object, but on the textual production that is necessary before the textual production of the 
object can begin. The interpreting subject, in this sense, can never really begin the work of 
objectúying the world "outside" because the theoretical model of language with which it starts 
both can, and cannot, be taken as "read". That is, it can be taken as read in so far that it has 
been subject to textual production (reading), but it cannot "be taken as read" (Le. "certain") 
in so far that the interpretation of the system could never (in its own terms) be beyond question 
- it being an inevitable product of hermeneutical acts. 
1 have just written "in its own terms" which presents me with a double bind: to claim 
that the system r a d i d y  d s  into question unproblematic cornmunication already assumes that 
some form of communication has taken place, but the question always rernains: is this beyond 
hermeneutical doubt? Put another way, the plea on the part of the cntic to understand the 
object under analysis is d e d  into question according to a Lac(k)anian critique of the sign. Yet 
if the symbolic order is unable to satisfy the critic's demands to know the object, neither does 
it, or can it, satis@ the critic's desire to laiow the theoretical scheme that is supposed to 
provide the paradigm for an analysis of the object. Given the ontological instabilities created 
in the wake of postmodern discourses, Thomas Docherty has called for a certain "humility" 
Ms a vis the object of understanding (Docherty, 1996: viii). This involves the location (and if 
necessary, production) of forms of difficulty. 1 would extend this "humiiity" (or what I'd 
prefer to call "wariness" or a certain hesitancy) to considerations of the conceptual bases of 
the forms of difficulty that are being produced: the theoretical scheme that gives the subject 
its position and the possibility of reading is aiready an object of interpretation. If all this seems 
to point in the direction of madness, it may be worth recalling that for the Lac(k)anian critic 
("1 think where 1 am not. .." etc.), like the Moor, there is no way one cannot be out of one's 
rnind. 
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NOTES 
1. T ~ I S  article started out as a paper written for the twenty-first AEDEAN wngress in Seville and a chapter on 
psychoanalysis in which 1 attempted to demonstrate to students how some simplified Lac(k)anian concepts may 
be put into practice (see Gregor and Waiton, 1997). Here 1 attempt to bring together the differing aims of the 
source material and put them into the thematics of "communication and culture: texts written in the Engiish 
language". 
2. The book was fim pubiished in 1962, but 1 refer to the revised edition (revised íirst in 1966 and then slightly 
extended by the "Retrospect and Prospect" chapter in 1975). 
3. My way of mediating the history of linguistics is infíuenced here by the metaphorical master narrative of 
Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970). 
4. Relevant to arguments of the lack of a fixed centre from which to establish communication is Demda's 
"Stnicture, Sign and Play in the Discourses of the Hurnan Sciences" @emda, 1978). 
5. 1 say "Lac(k)anianfl for two reasons. Firstly, as is the case with just about every school of thought, there is 
no wmmon agreernent about exactly what the Lac(k)anian system is. Lac(k)anian thought being, iike Marxism, 
Freudianism etc., a collection of "controlling concepts" which thematically unite those in the panicular school. 
However, the content of the controlling concepts is far from fixed and a constant source of disputation. 
Secondly, this simtion is made especially difficult for the "Lac(k)anianW by the fact that Lacan did not seek to 
be understood without effort: "Wnting is distinguished by a prevaience of the texf in the sense that this factor 
of discourse will assume in this essay a factor that makes possible the kind of tightening up that 1 like in order 
to leave the reader no other way out than the way in, which 1 prefer to be difficult. In that sense, then, this will 
not be writing" (Lacan, 1977: 146). 
6. Tracing the Greek etymology of the word ailegory would bring out what 1 am trying to get at here. Allos is 
"other" and agoreuo "to speak" from agora, a forum. To speak, to write, to express in any way is to perform 
within the sign system of the Lac(k)anian Other. Lacan's deíinition of the Other (and any "other" concept) is 
notoriously arcane. One may start with "The Field of the Other and Back to the Transference" in The Fow 
Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis (Lacan, 1979:20 1 f.). 
7. Lacan goes into considerable detail about how, on looking at a painting, we are occupying the gaze of others 
(e.g. the painter or the audience it is associated with). See "What is a Picture?" (Lacan, 1979: 105f.; especially 
113). 
8. For the subject's division in the symbolic see "The Subject and the Other" (Lacan, 1979:204f.). 
9. See "The Subject and the Other: Apbanisis" for Lacan's discussion of how the "unary" signifier relates to the 
" b i i "  signifier (which heraids the entry into the symbolic) (Lacan, 1979:218). 
10. See, for example, chapter 16 of The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis (Lacan, 1979:203f.). 
One of the easiest ways of thinking about the Real is to see it as the phenomenal world or that which lacks the 
lack or that upon which the symboiic is at work (See Lacan, 1979:ix & 53-4). 
11. In the Lac(k)anian system the unconscious is structured Iike a language because it is the discourse of the 
Other: that is to say, the symboiic stnictures through which the subject articulates itself (and is amculated by 
others) these being the unwnscious mechanisms which render ail forms of diswurse possible in the h t  place. 
12. See Écrits (Lacan, 1977:lZf.). 
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13. Urna acaialy tunis out to be a rnanipulator, seductress and ruiner of people's lives. The fact that she seems 
different to the various members of the Moor's family is owing to her ability to "take on radically different 
pemnae in the wmpany of different people" (Rushdie, 1996:266). Despite this, the passage can still serve as 
an allegory of the sign, but it might be stressed that it's an aliegorization and not stnctly descnptive of the 
fictional complexity of the character. 
The italicized phrases in the following quotations are Rushdie's. 
14. Lacan descnbed need as having to pass through the "defiles" of the signifier to become a desire (Lacan, 
1977:264). For the Name or Law of the Father see "On a question prelimmary to any possible treament of 
psychosis" (Lacan, 1977:179f.); and for a simplified thumbnail sketch (Lacan, 1979:282). 
15. The novel is very suggestive from the point of view of an analysis of the instability of the sign, and 1 can 
hardly do justice to it here. However, an example: on Carmen's wedding night her husband, Camoens, instead 
of consummating the d a g e ,  dresses himself in the bridai gown in order to escape the nuptial bed and enjoy 
a night of same-sex bliss. Thus, one signifier, the bndai gown, whose wmmon signified is that of heterosexual 
marital union, slides across the signifying continuum to become a token of gayness and transvestism. 
16. For the "mirror stage" see "The mirror stage as formative of the function of the 1" (Lacan, 1977:lf.) 
17. See Todorov's "Narrative Men" in The Poetics of Prose where he describes how Scheherazade's narrative 
loquacity in the Arabian Nighfs preserves her life; the conclusion being that "narrating equals living" (Todorov, 
1977:73Q. Foucault has reflected on the power of narrative to confer life and death from an historical point of 
view. The narration of stones, exemplified by the Greek epic and which functions as a theme and pretext in The 
Thousand and One Nights, was an attempt to "forestal1 death" or "postpone the day of reckoning that would 
silence the narrator" (Foucault, 1991 : 102). 
18. Jeffrey Mehlman in his A Structural Study of Autobiography: Proust, Leiris, Uvi-Strauss has written: 
"Indeed, whereas the normal tendency or error - of "psychoanalytic cntics" is to "use" Freud in order to 
"explain" a literary text, 1 have found myself more often refening to the authors studied here as a means of 
illuminating particularly difficult passages in Lacan" (Mehlman, 1974: 15). See also Zizek who tends to practice 
this form of criticism. 
19. Demda has deco11stnicted Lacan's concept of "lack" on the grounds that it canuot really uphold the theory 
of lack. This is because Lacan has to pnvilege the word lack, which, far from beimg the sign for lack, par 
exceiience, is the pnvileged signifier which renders the theory possible. In short, lack canuot be full of lack. 
The argument is considerably more complex than 1 represent it here (involving also the Phallus); however, see 
Demda's "Le Facteur de la Vérité" in The Post Card @enida, 1987:413496). Zizek has offered a defence of 
the Lac(k)anian lack in ?%e Sublime Object of Ideology (1989: 154-5). 
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